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Estimating the Effects of Corruption
Implications for Bangladesh
I. Introduction
Corruption is an age-old problem, but only recently has it started attracting the
global attention of policy makers and development practitioners2 . A growing volume of
empirical analysis, discussed in greater detail below, demonstrates that corruption hinders
growth and investment, aggravates poverty and inequality, and thus hurts the overall
wellbeing of people. Since there is no universally accepted indicator that measures
corrupt practices, it is less clear how adequately empirical models can capture corruption.
While there is no agreement in the literature on how to define the phenomenon of
corruption, one thing is clear: corruption is a governance problem. Corruption is a result
of weak state management and exists when individuals or organizations have monopoly
power over a good or service, discretion over making decisions, limited or no
accountability, and low levels of income (Klitgaard, 1998)3. The frequently cited World
Bank definition of corruption, used in this paper, is the abuse of public office for private
gain4 . This does not necessarily mean that corruption exists only in the public sector.
Rather that corruption in the public sector is more important for the purposes of public
policy in developing economies and the public sector should take the lead in establishing
high standards of integrity and accountability.
The objective of this paper is to empirically scrutinize the consequences of
corruption across countries. The paper builds on the pioneering work of Barro (1991)
and extends the work of Mauro (1995) on corruption to the most recent period, i.e., the
1990s to see whether the relationship between corruption and growth and between
corruption and investment has changed in recent years in comparison to earlier decades.
We move away from Mauro's implicit assumption that the corruption index value for a
relatively short period of time can be used as a proxy for the long run. We further
augment Mauro's model by including significant regional dummy variables in an attempt
to take account of various region specific effects (i.e., the intercept heterogeneity in the
regional context). This, in turn, is expected to reduce the extent of potential omitted
variable bias. The paper also analyzes the sensitivity of corruption in the presence and
absence of various policy, geographic and demographic variables that are widely used in
empirical growth and investment literature.
Overall, the evidence presented in this paper supports two arguments: (i)
corruption is significantly and negatively associated with cross-country differences in
economic growth and gross domestic investment; and (ii) corruption can reduce growth
by driving away foreign direct investment, a source of capital that is especially important
2 Greater awareness about this chronic phenomenon has emerged following the end of the Cold War with
the flourishing of democracy and free press around the world that has increased the "voice" of civil society.
The criminalization of bribery in the US and similar recent initiatives by OECD countries have also helped.
3 Klitgaard (1998) defines corruption as: C= M + D - A - S, where C is corruption, M is monopoly, D is
discretion, A is accountability and S is public sector salaries.
4 Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, PREM, World Bank, 1997.
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for developing countries with limited capacity for developing technologies and know-
how.
Given the possibility of endogeniety, which is usual in this type of cross-country
analysis, the estimated relationships should be viewed as partial associations, not
necessarily as causal linkages. However, like Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-
Martin (1997) among others we leave this endogeneity issue (i.e., both identification and
testing the strength of instrumental variables) beyond the scope of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a brief survey of existing
theories and empirical work on corruption. Section II presents reasons why the research
conducted by this paper was undertaken, including the paper's methodology, data
sources, and models used in empirical work. Section III discusses the regression results
for economic growth and gross domestic investment and also presents results for models
measuring the impact of corruption on inflows of gross foreign investment. Brief
concluding remarks are given in Section IV.
II. Literature Review
11.1. The Theoretical Debate
Until recently, where there appears to be growing agreement that corruption is
harmful, theories regarding the impact of corruption on efficiency have been
contradictory. Some studies have advocated that corruption greases the wheels of
business and commerce and thus facilitates growth and investment, while others have
claimed that rather than greasing, corruption really slows down the wheels by
institutionalizing itself through its chronic persistence. Corruption with theft (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1993) or collusive corruption (Bardhan, 1997) occurs when investors reap the
benefits of a corrupt state machinery by forging patron-client relationships with that
machinery and realize windfall gains, although the state loses revenue. Such corruption is
mutually beneficial for both the officials concerned and their clients, but can be harmful
to the state. Corruption without theft occurs where the tacit collusion is absent, but
officials extract extra payments from their clients, in addition to official charges, because
of their discretionary powers. In this case, corruption, by increasing the hidden cost of
doing business, retards both domestic and foreign investment and thus economic growth
and the nations poverty reduction objectives. This type of corruption is also harmful for
the state revenue, because a lower growth transfers into a lower revenue base.
In the literature, the debate on the effect of corruption has led to two opposing
strands. One strand, which can be labeled as the efficiency enhancing strand views
corruption as increasing efficiency. The opposing strand, labeled as efficiency reducing,
views corruption as having a damaging impact on efficiency.
Motivated by Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968), the efficiency enhancing school
of thought argues that corruption increases economic growth for a number of reasons.
First, acting as "speed money", bribes enable entrepreneurs to avoid bureaucratic delay.
Lui (1985), in an interesting equilibrium queuing model, shows that bribing strategies
form a Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game that minimizes waiting costs thereby
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reducing inefficiency in public administration. Second, while the poor pay structure does
not motivate the bureaucrats to work, lack of accountability further enables them to be
inert as they are not compelled to show cause to the people for their lethargy. Thus, bribe,
in this circumstance would induce the bureaucracy to function efficiently. Third, from
the point of view of welfare economics, in a "second best" world of pre-existing policy-
induced distortions, additional distortions in the form of black-marketeering, smuggling,
etc. may actually improve welfare5.
Moving away from the rather extreme efficiency enhancing strand, some studies
have taken a more moderate view and argue that corruption does not necessarily hamper
allocation efficiency. For instance, allocative efficiency is maintained even if a corrupt
bureaucrat ignores principles of competitive bidding and awards contracts to the highest
bidder, because it is the lowest cost firm that can afford to pay the highest bribe.
Allocative efficiency exists in such a competitive bidding process, even under incomplete
information (Beck and Maher 1986, Lien 1986).
Those opposing the "speed money" proposition, argue that, by forming perverse
patron-client relationships with the bureaucracy and state machinery and by diverting
resources and talent from productive purposes to corrupt practices, corrupt investors
hamper the overall prosperity of the nation by reducing economic growth by adversely
affecting the quality and quantity of investment. Citing the findings of the 1964
Santhanam Committee on the Prevention of Corruption, appointed by the Government of
India, Myrdal (1968) claimed that rather than speeding up the process, corrupt officials
actually caused severe administrative delays in order to attract more bribes. When
corruption is pervasive, the person paying the bribe is often forced to engage in more
malpractice by bribing others and those in higher authority, which further increases
transaction costs.
Similarly, Andvig (1991) opposes Lui's (1985) equilibrium queuing model that
suggests that bribery reduces inefficiency of public administration by minimizing waiting
costs associated with the queue. He argues that Lui's assumptions regarding queues are
unduly restrictive and suggests that queues are more complex and many-sided under
imperfect information. Strategic considerations and different ways of organizing the
queues could greatly reduce average waiting time and Lui's model is not robust enough
to take these considerations into account.
In an environment characterized by a malfunctioning state, governance failure and
weak institutions, there is no guarantee that the corrupt official would award the bid to
the most efficient firm that is also willing to pay the highest bribe, as discussed above. As
observed in many countries, including Bangladesh, nepotism and perverse client-patron
relationships dominate business transactions. As a result, corrupt officials are more likely
to be influenced by these relationships, than by monetary incentives alone. The existence
of extensive client-patron relationships could result in contracts being diverted to friends
and relatives in anticipation of future favors being granted.
5 As pointed out by Bardhan (1997), the efficiency improving argument of corruption is an extension of this
idea of second-best principle.
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11.2. Empirical Evidence
Following Barro's (1991) pioneering work, there has been a remarkable expansion
in the empirical literature on economic growth and investment6 . Using Barro's
framework, Mauro (1995) pioneered the econometric investigation of the impact of
corruption on economic growth and investment across countries. Using Business
International (BI) data for 70 countries for the period 1980-83, he found a significant
negative relationship between corruption and the average annual economic growth rate
over the 1960-85 period, and between corruption and the investment-GDP ratio and other
kinds of investments for 1960-85 and for 1980-85 as well. Interestingly enough, Mauro
did not find any empirical support for the "speed money" argument which states that in
the presence of a slow bureaucracy, corruption can get bureaucrats to work faster.
Further confirming the negative relationship between corruption and investment,
one of his more recent studies (Mauro, 1997) finds that corruption reduces expenditures
on health and education. As the opportunities to extract rents from public expenditures on
health and education are relatively less, corruption distorts public expenditures away
from health and education and encourages excessive infrastructure and capital intensive
investment. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) also examine the effects of corruption on public
finances and find that corruption increases public investment at the expense of private
investment and skews the composition of public expenditure away from the maintenance
of past investment towards new investment. In this way, the productivity of public
investment and of a country's infrastructure is reduced because of corruption. In contrast
to increasing public expenditure, corruption reduces tax revenue as it encourages tacit
collusion between tax and custom officials and their clients, along the lines of the
corruption with theft model discussed above. Moreover, because of a corrupt
bureaucracy, it is difficult for the government to raise tax revenue as firms go
underground not necessarily to avoid tax but to avoid bureaucratic regulation (Johnson,
Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998).
The adverse effects of corruption on foreign direct investment (FIDI) are analyzed
by Wei (1997a) who finds that corruption, acting like a tax, reduces foreign direct
investment. Wei (1997b) further concludes that the less predictable the level of
corruption (i.e., the higher is its variance), the greater is its impact on FDI as higher
variance makes corruption act like an unpredictable and random tax that increases risk
and uncertainty. Thus, increases in corruption and in its randomness are equivalent to
increases in the tax rate on enterprises. He demonstrates, for instance, that if India's
corruption level were reduced to Singapore's level, its effect on attracting foreign
investment would be the same as reducing its marginal corporate tax rate by 22
percentage points (Wei, 1998).
Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme (1998) carried out an elaborate empirical study
on the effects of corruption on inequality. They found that corruption tends to increase
inequality and poverty through lower economic growth; biased tax systems favoring the
rich and influential; lower social spending, unequal access to education and poor
6 Some earlier attempts in a similar spirit are Robinson (1971) and Kormendi and Meguire (1985).
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targeting of social programs; interest-group lobbying that perpetuates asset inequality;
and increased risk for investment decisions of the poor.
III. Basic Methodology and the Model
As mentioned earlier, this paper uses the work by Barro and Mauro as a point of
departure and updates their classic framework by looking at a more recent period, a
broader range of issues, and by introducing additional dependent variables into the
model.
JI.1. Methodology
Empirically, in order to determine the quantitative magnitude of the impact of
corruption on people's life, one would normally apply traditional time series econometric
analysis. However, problems of data unavailability compel us to limit ourselves to cross-
country empirical investigation. We use the so-called "Barro cross-country regression"
framework to investigate the impact of corruption on economic growth and domestic
investment and build on more recent empirical work by Mauro (1995) and others.
Typically, the Barro framework relates the dependent variable in question to two
types of variables: a) the initial level of state variables that proxy for the initial stock of
physical and human capital, and b) a vector of policy variables chosen by government
and/or private agents. The initial level of real GDP per capita is used as a proxy for the
initial stock of physical capital (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1995), for which accurate data are
not available.
111.2. Growth and Investment Models
We augment Mauro's (1995) base model that controls for initial level of
development, initial quantity of human capital and population growth by including
statistically significant regional dummies7 . As growth theories are not explicit enough to
suggest all the explanatory variables that growth empiricists should use in growth
regressions (Sala-i-Martin, 1997), we then analyzed the sensitivity of corruption in the
presence and absence of various policy, geographic and demographic variables that are
widely used in empirical growth and investment literature8 .
We have several reasons for departing from the original model suggested by Mauro
(1995). These include:
7 The inclusion of dummies tries to control for the combined impact of various region specific factors on
the dependent variable, which might have been omitted from our model for various reasons. First, this
could be due to our ignorance of the complete and complex dynamics of economic development; second, it
could be a way to avoid model overfitting; and third and most importantly, to keep our model simple and
preserve clarity. Moreover, inclusion of dummies in this cross-country set up enables us to control for
intercept heterogeneity in the regional context. In fact, we included each of the regional dummies
separately and various combinations of them in order to identify which of the regional effects are robust. In
the paper we are reporting only the best fitted models. In detail results are available up on request.
8 In fact, Mauro's (1995) base model fares very poorly in our sample and time period when we tried to use
it for measuring both economic growth and domestic investment.
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* update and reassess corruption's impact for the most recent period, i.e., for the 1990s;
* change the measure of corruption by switching from the Business International (BI)
average corruption index for 1980-839 used by Mauro to the average International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index for 1991-97, which has been used quite
extensively in recent corruption literature because of unavailability of BI indices for
more recent years'0 ; and
* reduce the length of the period from 26 years (1960-85) as in Mauro to 8 years (1990-
97). We feel that the implicit assumption made by Mauro that the BI corruption index
value for 1980-83 can be a proxy for the entire 1960-85 period might be too
optimistic. Rather we choose the period in such a way so that it corresponds quite
closely to the dependent variable in question (i.e., growth, domestic and foreign
investment).
Although Barro's framework is generally used to explain long-run deterninants of
economic growth, here we have to restrict ourselves to a relatively shorter period of time.
We choose this period because before 1991 Bangladesh, the country of our special
interest, was ruled by a military regime. We preferred to sacrifice the length of the period,
rather than suffer from a problem of mixing up outcomes under the autocratic regime in
contrast to those under democracy. This period is also interesting because it has
witnessed enonnous national and intemational efforts to curb corruption and to promote
democracy. Thus, notwithstanding the global moves against corruption, it is interesting to
see how much a country, on average, has to pay for not being able to reduce corrupt
practices.
For example, a reasonably consistent data series on corruption for Bangladesh
starts only from 1991. As this paper was produced as a background paper for a World
Bank report of corruption in Bangladesh, we had to ensure that Bangladesh was in the
sample. Other researchers such as Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1998), however, have
also used Barro's framework for a shorter period of time to asses an impact of
institutional credibility on growth and investment.
Another reason for departing from Mauro (1995) is to demonstrate the sensitivity
of the effect of corruption in the presence of various other policy, geographic and
demographic variables that have been widely used in empirical growth literature
Thus the structure of our growth and investment models is as follows:
Growth Model:
g = a + 131(initial level of real GDP per capita) + ,B2(initial quantity of human capital) + 03
(initial quality of human capital) + 034(corruption) + ±) X/ + 0 (Z; Z £ Z") + e (1)
9 Mauro (1995) also regressed the investment-GDP ratio for 1980-85 on BI's corruption index in Table-IV
of his paper. However, his key analysis seems to be based on the growth and investment ratio for 1960-85.
'(For example, the index is used in Knack and Keefer (1995), Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), Gupta, Davoodi,
and Alonso-Terme (1998), Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999), and Wei (1998) among others.
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Investment Model:
I = o + 1J1(initial level of real GDP per capita) + 1)2(initial quantity of human capital) + U3
(initial quality of human capital) + 14(corruption) + ,U X/ + p (Z; Z E Z/) + e (2)
where, g and I imply average annual growth rates and the investment-to-GDP ratio,
respectively. X', is a vector of regional dummies, Z' is a pool of policy, geographic and
demographic variables that are widely used in the literature1 , and e is the error tenn. The
quantity of human capital is measured by secondary school enrollment, while the quality
of human capital is measured by the pupil-teacher ratio in secondary schools.
Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder (1998) argue that the credibility of rules established
by government can influence both economic growth and investment by affecting the
accumulation and allocation of resources. We use the same approach and separate these
two effects by separately estimating growth and investment regressions. The investment
regression in our paper measures the effect of corruption on the accumulation of
resources while the growth regression tries to capture the effect of corruption on
allocation.
111.3. Data Sources
Although various organizations produce quantifiable measures that are widely used
by researchers to link economic performance with the efficiency of institutions, the main
limitation of the majority of these measures is their heavy bias towards the perception of
foreign investors and experts, their poll-based nature and limited coverage. Survey-based
indices, which are of better overall quality, unfortunately have limited country coverage
and compatibility. Recognizing that there is no ideal index that measures corruption, this
paper measures corruption using a perception index called the International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG)12 corruption index which, as mentioned above, has been used quite
extensively in recent corruption literature.
There are several other indices that measure different aspects of corruption, such as
the Business International Index (BI), the Transparency International index (TI), and the
World Economic Forum index (GCR). There are also indices that were prepared for the
World Bank's 1997 World Development Report including a Private Sector Survey and
work done by Kauffman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). Despite very different
sources of data, the correlation among the indices is quite high. The simple correlation
coefficients between the BI and TI indices and between the BI and GCR indices are 0.88
and 0.77, respectively. Thus, conclusions reached on the basis of a particular index can be
considered robust as they are not very sensitive to the choice of index.
" The list of this pool of variables is appended to the end of the paper.
12 International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) is a subsidiary of Political Risk Services (PRS) Group. ICRG
provides a detailed country-by-country breakdown of the comparative risks of operating in, investing in, or
lending to particular countries.
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ICRG uses a three-dimensional evaluation system that weighs the composite risk
and identifies desegregated political, financial and economic risks by indicator through a
predetermined number of risk sub-indicators, which are grouped into three main
categories - political, financial and economic. Each sub-indicator is assigned a point
rating, up to a specified maximum, on the basis of information and data analyzed and
assessed by ICRG staff. For the chosen period, the ICRG corruption index ranges from 1
to 6 for all countries in our sample. The higher values of the index imply lower
corruption levels. The data is collected and published on a monthly basis for more than
130 countries.
For this paper, monthly data is averaged to obtain annual values for the corruption
index for the 1991-97 period. The sample of countries ranges from 63 to 79 countries for
the growth and domestic investment models and from 47 to 61 countries for the model on
foreign investment, representing a broad range of development experience and
encompassing both developing and developed economies.
Data for the explanatory variables, namely schooling, area and distance (average
distance to the capitals of the world's 20 major exporters, weighted by the values of
bilateral imports) are from Barro and Lee (1994). Data for other variables are taken from
the World Bank's SIMA database (except otherwise mentioned).
IV. Regression Results
In this section we present the main empirical results of the impact of corruption on
economic growth, and on gross domestic and foreign direct investment. In all cases
higher levels of corruption are shown to have a negative effect on the dependent
variables.
IV.1. Corruption and Economic Growth
We first test the relationship between the corruption indicator and average per
capita growth rates for 1990-97. The ICRG index assigns higher values to less corrupt
countries; therefore, we expect a positive relationship. The sample scatter plot is shown
in Figure 1.
Table 1 displays the multivariate regression results. Our "base" model (Model 1)
shows that the sign of the coefficient for the corruption variable is positive and
marginally significant at 5 percent confidence level, controlling for a country's initial
level of development, its initial quality and quantity of human capital, and for various
region specific effects'3. Quantitatively, one standard deviation improvement in the
corruption index (1.2 points on the scale between 1 and 6), would increase the dependent
variable, in this case growth, by 0.79 points.
13 Following the usual approach of growth empirics, we use the log of GNP per capita in 1985 as a proxy
for the initial level of development, gross secondary school enrollment rate, 1985 (most commonly defined
as ratio of children of all ages enrolled in secondary schools to the country's population of secondary
school age children) as a proxy for initial quantity of human capital; pupil/teacher ratio in secondary
school, 1980 as a proxy for initial quality of human capital of a country and regional dummies to capture
region specific effects.
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Figure 1. Corruption and Growth, 1991-1997
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Table 1: Impact of corruption on growth in per capita GNP, 1990-97
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate, 1990-97
Independent Variables Base model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Log of GNP per capita, 1985 -0.48 -1.31** -1.14** -1.08** -0.88* -1.11**
(-0.96) (2.73) (2.23) (2.17) (1.76) (2.26)
Gross secondary school enrollment 5.33** 3.58** 2.76 2.76 2.38 2.39
rate, 1985 (2.29) (2.12) (1.56) (1.58) (1.41) (1.44)
Pupil/teacher ratio in secondary -0.03 -0.08** -0.07* -0.07** -0.07* -0.06*
school, 1985 (-1.36) (2.67) (1.90) (1.88) (1.85) (1.78)
Gross domestic investment-GDP ratio, 0.14** 0.15** 0.16** 0.15**
average for 1990-97 (2.71) (2.83) (3.02) (2.89)
ICRG corruption index value, 0.66**a 0.63** 0.56** 0.61** 0.51*
average for 1991-97 (1.93) (2.19) (2.07) (2.25) (1.82)
Government consumption as % of -0.08**
GDP, average for 1990-97 (2.04)
Average annual population growth -0.31
rate, 1990-97 (1.27)
South East Asia 3.23** 4.25** 2.35** 2.12** 1.62** 2.04**
(3.96) (5.94) (2.73) (2.48) (1.99) (2.41)
Latin America 0.90* 1.78** 1.5 1** 1.35** 0.94 1.27**
(1.67) (2.84) (2.66) (2.43) (1.56) (2.29)
Middle East & North Africa 0.63 1.14* 0.43
(0.98) (1.67) (0.67)
South Asia 2.10** 2.02** 2.02** 1.91** 1.59** 1.69**
(3.10) (2.30) (2.78) (2.68) (2.37) (2.35)
Constant 3.67 8.65** 4.76 4.44 4.09 5.55
(0.98) (2.32) (1.09) (1.03) (0.95) (1.23)
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.31 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.43
# of observations 90 79 78 78 78 78
Note: Numbers in parentheses are White's heteroskedasticity consistent standard error based t-ratio. **Significant at
5% level; *Significant at 10% level. aMore precisely. the index is significant at 5.8% level.
Literally speaking, following Wei (1998) this would mean that for Bangladesh, a
reduction in corruption from its current level (average ICRG index value for 1991-97
equals 1.76 - see Annex 1 for ICRG data) to a level of, say, Poland and Hungary (average
ICRG index value for 1991-97 equals 5.0) would increase Bangladesh's annual average
growth rate during 1990-97 by 2.14 percentage points (.66 * (5-1.76) = 2.14). Thus, in
other words, if corruption in Bangladesh could be reduced to levels existing in transition
economies like Poland, then during the 1990-97 period Bangladesh could have increased
its annual average per capita growth rate by more than 2 percent (from 3.4 percent to
about 5.5 percent per annum). Figure 2 shows that if Bangladesh would experience this
rate of growth, which is comparable to growth rates experienced by Argentina and
Thailand during the same period, than Bangladesh per capita GNP would have crossed
the $400 mark in 1997. In other words the difference even over a short period of time (8
years) would be $63, or 18% increase compare to the actual 1997 per capita GNP of
$350.
There are at least two reasons why we used two most advanced transitional
economies as comparators. First, among LDCs - these countries have the highest values
of ICRG index - 5.0 (the only other LDC countries which are enjoying the same high
ratings are Costa Rica and South Africa). Second, regardless of their transitional status
and unlike many other transitional economies at a similar stage of development, Poland
and Hungary have managed to build sustainable institutional systems. This, in turn,
supports the argument that a lower level of development, by itself, is not an excuse for a
corrupt and dysfunctional institutional structure.
Models 2 through 5 in Table 1 test whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion
of additional explanatory variables. Controlling for the level of gross domestic
investment, government consumption and population growth, the corruption index has
the expected positive sign and remains significant. In all five models in Table 1 the
controlling variables also have expected signs.
Figure 2. GNP per Capita Growth ($US, 1989-1997): Two Scenarios
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The starting level of per capita GNP is used to control for the neoclassical
convergence effect and, as expected, has a negative sign due to decreasing returns to
capital. According to this argument, countries with lower initial levels of GNP should
grow faster and gradually converge to levels of development prevailing in more advanced
countries. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) argue that the neoclassical growth model
does not predict an absolute convergence. According to them, each country converges to
a conditional steady state, which depends mostly on the quantity (and quality) of the
countries' human capital. As Table 1 summarizes, the quantity of human capital has the
expected positive sign indicating that education has a positive effect on growth, while the
quality of human capital has the intuitively expected negative sign and is significant at
the 10 percent level.
The level of statistical significance of the impact of corruption increases to the 5
percent level (Model 2), if we control for the average gross domestic investment to GDP
ratio for the 1990-97 period. Although investment is a classic determinant of economic
growth, its use as an explanatory variable in growth models is subject to criticism on
account of problems of endogeneity. The point we would like to make is that the focal
variable, corruption, is both economically and statistically significant, irrespective of
controlling for the investment ratio. In fact, given the endoneity problem associated with
investment in empirical growth models, most, if not all, researchers tend to estimate the
growth equation both with and without investment as an explanatory variable (see for
instance, Barro 1991, Sala-i-Martin 1997, Levine and Renelt 1992).
After controlling for investment, a one standard deviation improvement in the
corruption index (1.2 points on the scale between 1 and 6), would increase the dependent
variable (economic growth) by 0.76 points. The regional effect of Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) becomes insignificant, once we control for the domestic investment to
GDP ratio. Dropping MENA results in a 0.67 percentage increase in growth due to a one
standard deviation improvement in the corruption index (Model 3).
Among the different policy, geographic and demographic variables, only
govemment consumption (as a percentage of GDP for the 1990-97 period) seems to
affect growth negatively and significantly (Model 4). Controlling for government
consumption results in a 0.73 percent increase in growth due to a one standard deviation
improvement in the corruption index. Following Mauro (1995), we also use population
growth as a regressor in our model (Model 5). However, this variable does not appear to
be robust,14 although corruption remains statistically significant.
Thus, literally speaking, our results indicate that if Bangladesh were able to reduce
corruption levels to those found in the more advanced East European countries (i.e.,
Poland or Hungary) holding other things constant, its corresponding annual average
growth rate during 1990-97 could have been increased by between 1.65-2.14 percentage
14 The negative association between population growth and economic growth is statistically significant if
instead of controlling for both the quality and quantity of human capital, we only control for initial quality
of human capital.
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points . Achieving these rates of growth over the post-independence period would have
resulted in per capita GNP of between US$524-587 (in 1995 constant $US) in 1997,
compared to its actual per capita GNP of US$350. Even more dramatically, the results
indicate that if Bangladesh were able to reduce corruption levels to those prevailing in
advanced countries like Switzerland, Denmark, Norway and Canada, annual average
rates of growth could increase by 2.12 - 2.88 percentage points annually, implying per
capita GNP levels of between US$592 and US$690 in 1997.
Analysis undertaken during the preparation of the Bangladesh 2020 report16 shows
that an extra 2-3 percent increase in economic growth per annum could cut the incidence
of extreme poverty from the current 36 percent to about 11 percent by the year 2020. This
in turns shows how corruption, by reducing economic growth, is adversely affecting the
pace of poverty reduction in Bangladesh.
IV.2. Corruption and Gross Domestic Investment
The effect of corruption on gross domestic investment is highly significant, both
from an economic and statistical point of view (Table 2). Together with highly significant
regional dummies, our base model explains 54 percent of the cross-country variation in
investment rates. Models 2 and 3 in Table 2 are used to illustrate the robustness of the
corruption indicator.
Quantitatively, as per the base model (Model 1), a one standard deviation
improvement in the corruption index (1.2 points on the scale between 1 and 6) would
increase the investment-GDP ratio by 2.36 percentage points. In order to examine
whether our base model is overfitted, the paper examines the sensitivity of corruption's
impact by controlling for the initial quantity (Model 2) and quality of human capital
(Model 3), along with other base controls. Thus literally speaking, our results illustrate
that if Bangladesh could reduce its corruption level to that of, for example, the least
corrupt East European countries, its gross domestic investment-GDP ratio would have
been increased by 5.3 to 6.4 percentage points17 (see Figure 3). Similarly, if it could
reduce corruption to levels existing in the more advanced economies such as Sweden and
Norway, investment levels could increase by 7 to 8 percentage points per annum.
Assuming an incremental capital output ratio of 3-4, this implies that additional
GDP growth of between 1.3 and 2.1 percentage points could have been realized by
reducing corruption. This quantitative magnitude of increase in growth further conforms
the findings of the econometric model of corruption and economic growth discussed in
the earlier section.
15 The corresponding increase in growth rate would be 2.14% in model 1, 2.04% in model 2, 1.81% in model 3, 1.98%
in model 4, and 1.65% in model 5.
16See Bangladesh 2020: A Long Term Perspective Study; The World Bank and Bangladesh Center for
Advanced Studies; Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1998.
17 More precisely, the increase in investment-GDP ratio would be 6.4% in model 1 and 6.2% in model 2,
and 5.3% in model 3.
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Table 2: Impact of corruption on gross domestic investment/GNP, 1990-97
Dependent variable: gross domestic investment-GDP ratio, average for 1990-97
Independent Variables Base model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Log of GNP per capita, 1985 0.50 -0.35 -0.60 0.70
(0.35) (0.31) (0.49) (0.65)
Gross secondary school enrollment rate, 1985 6.03 3.09 2.66
(1.34) (0.70) (0.55)
Pupil/teacher ratio in secondary school, 1985 0.02 0.06 0.17
(.24)... (0.56) (1.11)
Distance 0.39 0.28 0.26 0.26
(1.22) (0.87) (0.84) (0.78)
ICRG corruption index value, average for 1.97** 1.92** 1.63*
1993-97 _ (2.51) (1.86)
South East Asia 13.51** 14.20** 14.69** 12.87**
(5.38) (5.86) (6.33) (4.59)
Latin America 1.27 3.39** 3.36**a 2.94
_ _ _ (0.70) (2.03) ~~~~(1.93) (1.53)
Middle East & North Africa 7.03** 8.78** 8.81** 7.88**
l (3 90) (4.89) (5.08) (4.06)
South Asia 4.08** 5.03** 5.04** 4.67**
_ _ _ (2.38) (2.44) (2.74) (2.07)
Constant 8.28 8.71 12.29 1.89
(0 76) (0.90) (1.30) ~~~~~~~~~(0.19)
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.54 0.52 0.44
# of observations 63 69 65
Note: Numbers in parentheses are White's heteroskedasticity consistent standard error based t-statistics.
"*Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level. aMore precisely, the index is significant at 5.8%
level.
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IV.3. Gross Direct Foreign Investment
Corruption is also shown to exert a strong negative influence on levels of gross
foreign investment (see Chart 4 below). Foreign investment is different from domestic
investment from at least two perspectives. First, foreign investors are usually more
sensitive to the institutional setting in the host countries. Second, since these investors
are outsiders to the countries' political processes, they are less familiar with the
bureaucracy, and in many instances are less than welcome by local businesspeople and
general population18 . As a result they are more likely to take their business elsewhere if
the institutional environment is perceived as unfriendly and bureaucratic discretion is too
high. Chart 4 and empirical results in Table 3 support this conclusion.
Figure 4. Scatter plot of Gross FDI and Freedom from Corruption
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The four simple models, summarized in Table 3, demonstrate that the extent of
corrupt practices in a country significantly affect gross foreign direct investment, both
statistically and economically. Every standard deviation (1.2 points on the scale between
1 and 6) of reduction in corruption increases the level of gross foreign direct investment,
measured as a percentage of GDP, by about 1.2 percentage points. For illustrative
purpose, these results for Bangladesh can be interpreted in a way that even a slight
reduction of corrupt practices, say from the current level as mentioned above to that in
India (ICRG 1991-97 average equals 2.71) would bring enormous benefits, equivalent to
about US$300 million of foreign direct investment per year.
18 This information isrevealed in a survey of 117 senior managers of western manufacturing companies
(Lankes, Hans-Peter and Anthony Venables, 1996):
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Model 3 in Table 3 also shows that by controlling for the usual initial level of state
variables that proxy for the initial stock of physical and human capital and for the
openness of the economy, 64 percent of the cross-country variation in foreign direct
investment levels can be explained.
Table 3: Impact of corruption on gross foreign direct investmentlGNP, 1990-97
Dependent variable: gross foreign direct investment-GDP ratio, avera e for 1990-97
Independent Variables Base model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Log of GNP per capita, 1985 1.18 0.80 0.85 0.65
(1.39) (0.85) (0.90) (1.20)
Gross secondary school enrollment rate, 1985 1.77 -0.59 -0.54 -0.67
(0.84) _ (-0.31) (-0.28) (-0.36)
Pupil/teacher ratio in secondary school, 1985 0.028 0.03 0.02 0.00
(0.49) (0.58) (0.34) (0.11)
ICRG corruption index value, average for 1.04** 1.02** 1.01**
1993-97 ( ) (241) (2.49)
Size of the country -0.00*
. ~~~~~~(-2.00)
Openness of the economy 0.03**
(4.22)
Constant -9.11 -8.51 -8.40 -8.69*
(-1.38) (-1.24) (-1.24) (-1.92)
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.32 0.34 0.64
# of observations 50 48 48 47
Note: Numbers in parentheses are White's heteroskedasticity consistent standard error based t-statistics.
**Significant at 5% level ; *Significant at 10% level.
Figure 5 shows that if a country's economy is closed and its institutions are corrupt
than it tends to loose foreign investment. The latter tendency is represented by a negative
value on the chart. For given levels of openness, countries with lower levels of
corruption have higher inflows of foreign investment. Figure 4 also shows that given the
degree of openness, foreign investment will be lower if corrupt practices persist.
Figure 5. Level of Gross Foreign Investment
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V. Concluding Remarks
This paper extends the pioneering work of Mauro (1995) to include the most recent
years for which data are available, i.e. the 1990s, to see whether the relationship between
corruption and growth and between corruption and investment has changed in recent
years in comparison to earlier decades. The paper then extends the analysis beyond
growth and investment and, although data limitations imply a need to interpret the results
with necessary caution, empirical results show that corruption has significant negative
effects on the amount of foreign direct investment. The paper also checks the robustness
and sensitivity of the impact of corruption on growth and investment as well as on other
dependent variables, i.e., gross foreign investment, by controlling for policy, geographic
and demographic effects, as well as various omitted region specific effects.
The paper findings suggest that countries serious about improving governance and
reducing corruption should redefine the role of government, overhaul the system of
incentives and strengthen domestic institutions in order to make sure that the necessary
checks and balances are in place. Such a holistic approach to reform would help to attract
more investment, both domestic and foreign, and accelerate the pace of economic growth
and poverty reduction.
17
Annex 1.
ICRG corruption index, 1991-1997 average19
Country Name Average ICRG Ranking2 '
corruption index,
1991-19971/
Albania 3.43 69
Algeria 3.15 59-60
Angola 2.91 34
Argentina 3.18 61
Australia 5.00 107-112
Austria 4.92 104-105
Bahrain 3.74 78
Bangladesh 1.76 6
Belgium 4.63 96
Bolivia 2.56 24
Botswana 3.36 67
Brazil 3.40 68
Brunei 4.44 94
Bulgaria 4.14 89
Burkina Faso 3.08 57
Carneroon 2.94 37
Canada 6.00 118-123
Chile 3.26 66
China 3.57 73-75
Colombia 2.72 27
Congo, Rep. 3.01 52
Costa Rica 5.00 107-112
Cote dlvoire 3.55 72
Cuba 2.96 38-39
Cyprus 4.73 97
Czech Republic 4.38 91-92
Denmark 6.00 118-123
Dominican Republic 3.19 62
Ecuador 3.12 58
Egypt, Arab Rep. 3.00 41-51
El Salvador 2.83 32
19 Only countries where data was available for all the underlining years are presented in this annex. During
1991-1997, the magnitude of the ICRG index for all countries in this sample was between 1 and 6.
18
Ethiopia 2.09 17
Country Name Average ICRG Ranking2'
corruption index,
1991-19971'
Finland 6.00 118-123
France 5.04 113
Gabon 1.05 2
Gambia, The 3.21 63
Ghana 3.06 54-55
Greece 5.00 107-112
Guatemala 2.43 22
Guinea 3.92 82
Guinea-Bissau 2.00 9-15
Guyana 2.11 18
Haiti 1.67 5
Honduras 2.00 9-15
Hong Kong, China 4.94 106
Hungary 5.00 107-112
Iceland 6.00 118-123
India 2.71 26
Indonesia 2.73 28
Iran, Islamic Rep. 3.57 73-75
Iraq 1.03 1
Ireland 4.83 98
Israel 4.87 101
Italy 3.54 70-71
Jamaica 2.67 25
Japan 4.92 104-105
Jordan 3.86 79-81
Kenya 2.96 38-39
Korea, Rep. 4.55 95
Kuwait 2.80 31
Lebanon 2.39 21
Libya 3.86 79-81
Luxembourg 5.82 117
Madagascar 4.00 84-88
Malawi 3.06 54-55
Malaysia 4.00 84-88
Mali 2.49 23
Malta 3.97 83
19
Mexico 2.84 33
Country Name Average ICRG Ranking2'
corruption index,
_ l~~~~~~~~~~~~991-1997 I
Mongolia 4.00 84-88
Morocco 3.00 41-51
Mozambique 4.00 84-88
Myanmar 1.83 7-8
Namibia 4.41 93
Netherlands 6.00 118-123
New Zealand 5.79 114-116
Nicaragua 4.85 99-100
Niger 2.93 36
Nigeria 2.00 9-15
Norway 5.79 114-116
Oman 3.00 41-51
Pakistan 2.13 19
Panama 2.00 9-15
Papua New Guinea 3.05 53
Paraguay 2.02 16
Peru 3.00 41-51
Philippines 2.79 29-30
Poland 5.00 107-112
Portugal 4.88 102
Qatar 2.00 9-15
Romania 3.73 77
Russian Federation 3.07 56
Saudi Arabia 2.00 9-15
Senegal 3.00 41-51
Sierra Leone 1.44 3
Singapore 4.00 84-88
Slovak Republic 4.18 90
Somalia 1.51 4
South Africa 5.00 107-112
Spain 4.38 91-92
Sri Lanka 3.23 64
Sudan 1.83 7-8
Suriname 3.00 41-51
Sweden 6.00 118-123
Switzerland 5.79 114-116
20
Syrian Arab Republic 3.57 73-75
Country Name Average ICRG Ranking2'
corruption index,
1991-1997"
Taiwan, China 3.86 79-81
Tanzania 3.70 76
Thailand 2.99 40
Togo 2.00 9-15
Trinidad and Tobago 3.00 41-51
Tunisia 3.00 41-51
Turkey 3.15 59-60
Uganda 2.79 29-30
United Arab Emirates 2.14 20
United Kingdom 4.91 103
United States 4.85 99-100
Uruguay 3.00 41-51
Venezuela 3.00 41-51
Vietnam 2.92 35
Yemen, Rep. 3.00 41-51
Zambia 3.24 65
Zimbabwe 3.54 70-71
1/ Annual average was calculated in two steps: (i) monthly values were averaged for
each of the years; (ii) annual values were averaged to obtain annual average ICRG
corruption index.
2/ If values of average ICRG corruption index were equal for several countries then
these countries were assigned to the same interval, i.e. Uruguay and Venezuela both
belong to 41-51 ranking interval. Higher ranking means that corruption is a lesser issue.
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Annex 2.
Correlation matrix for the variables used in the econometric analysis
-~~~~~~t r-
AFRICA 1 _ _= =
AREA -0.077 1 . _ _ _
AVGM9097 -0.088 -0.278 1 _ _ _
CORR9197 -0.274 0.106 0.116 1 _ _ .
DIST 0.346 0.100 -0.032 -0.388 1 _
GD19097 -0.304 -0.081 0.421 0.093 0.044 1 _ _
GF19097 -0.206 -0.051 0.514 0.566 -0.167 0.034 1 _ _ _
GOV9097 -0.002 0.074 0.137 0.278 -0.229 -0.029 0.248 1
GR9097 -0.321 -0.063 0.207 0.073 0.074 0.398 0.158 -0.295 1 _ _
LAC -0.280 0.011 -0.125 -0.249 0.168 -0.075 -0.211 -0.277 0.107 1
MENA -0.243 -0.034 0.100 -0.181 -0.154 0.121 -0.164 0.298 0.067 -0.210 1 = = = 
OPEN9097 -0.119 -0.246 0.964 0.174 -0.063 0.407 0.568 0.132 0.185 -0.116 0.043 1
POP90 -0.105 0.045 -0.106 -0.067 0.103 0.066 -0.106 -0.077 0.119 0.126 -0.020 -0.093 1 = 
POPG9097 0.402 -0.057 0.086 -0.449 0.387 -0.102 -0.246 -0.044 -0.121 -0.037 0.367 0.025 -0.009 1 _1_
S85 -0.654 0.124 0.159 0.695 -0.391 0.186 0.508 0.305 0.248 -0.066 0.031 0.240 0.014 -0.613 1 _
SA -0.104 0.026 -0.109 -0.162 0.113 -0.028 -0.173 -0.172 0.113 -0.090 -0.078 -0.108 -0.033 -0.005 -0.121 1
SEASIA -0.204 -0.078 0.265 0.010 0.186 0.444 0.113 -0.167 0.361 0.176 0.153 0.298 0.144 0.017 0.062 0.066 1
TEASEC80 0.325 -0.265 0.073 -0.269 0.253 0.021 -0.191 -0.292 0.129 0.034 -0.117 0.051 -0.055 0.323 -0.306 -0.065 0.201
Notice: Correlation based on a sample of 123 country observations.
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Annex 3.
Descriptive Statistics.
C~~~~~~~~~~~~
0
| .3 i *4 | ' _ |0 
ICRG corruption index, 1991-97 123 6.00 3.51 3.19 1.03 1.20 0.34 1.76 2.13 2.71 3.23
GNP per capita, 1985 (PPP Dollars) 107 19.930 4,957 3,165 290 4,736 0.96 550 773 721 1,176
GNP per capita growth, 1990-97 Ill 10.07 1.53 1.49 -7.76 2.84 1.86 3.36 1.74 3.69 3.94
Gross domestic investment/GNP, 1990-97 117 40.34 21.74 20.81 6.71 6.32 0.29 19.52 15.88 23.34 24.54
Gross FDI/GNP, 1990-97 60 13.57 2.16 1.07 0.02 2.58 1.20 0.02 0.28 NA 0.40
Pupillteacher ratio, 1980 90 42.90 20.65 20.40 5.90 7.38 0.36 21.10 16.20 16.90 NA
Gross secondary school enrollmnent, 1985 101 1.00 0.52 0.51 0.03 0.30 0.59 0.18 0.16 0.39 0.63
Government consumption/GDP, 1990-97 115 44.41 15.62 14.46 3.48 6.79 0.43 4.33 12.91 10.69 l 0.05
Population growth, 1990-97 123 6.69 1.84 1.93 -1.55 1.24 0.68 1.67 2,49 1.81 1.24
Size of the country (sq. km) 103 9976 847 300 1 1756 2.07 144 796 3288 66
Openness of the economy 116 350.38 73.181 64.441 3.63 49.13 0.67 24.13 NA 22.00 75.88
Average import/GDP, 1990-97 116 169.38 139.331 34.881 2.25 24.10 0.61 15.00 NA 112.13 42.63
NA - not available.
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